Cost allocation in investment arbitration: Forward toward incentivization by Nicholson, James & Gaffney, John
 Columbia FDI Perspectives 
Perspectives on topical foreign direct investment issues by 
the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment 
No. 123   June 9, 2014 
Editor-in-Chief: Karl P. Sauvant (Karl.Sauvant@law.columbia.edu) 
Managing Editor: Shawn Lim (shawnlwk@gmail.com) 
 
 
Cost allocation in investment arbitration: Forward toward incentivization 
by 
James Nicholson and John Gaffney* 
In their contribution to the FDI Perspectives series, Baiju Vasani and Anastasiya 
Ugale drew attention to an emerging trend in favor of the so-called “costs follow the 
event” (CFtE) (or loser pays) approach, which is in contrast to the more “traditional” 
approach under which parties share the costs of arbitration equally, with each party 
covering its own legal fees.1  
Vasani and Ugale suggested that, from a claimant’s perspective, “the traditional 
approach encourages arbitration” while “CFtE is largely a deterrent” to investment 
treaty arbitration and “makes arbitration less appealing to claimants (and would-be 
third-party funders), more risky and/or outright economically unviable.” 2  They 
concluded that “a default CFtE custom in the context of ICSID seems inapposite just 
at a time when [CFtE] appears to be gaining popularity”3 and argue that a harmonized 
approach to cost allocation between ICSID and commercial forums is likely 
inappropriate. 
While we welcome that the authors have initiated a renewed debate on this issue, and 
note that they raise a range of other objections to CFtE in the context of ICSID, we 
disagree with their criticism of CFtE as a deterrent to claimants. We suggest that CFtE 
incentivises meritorious claims while discouraging frivolous or weak claims.4  
 
If claimants act economically rationally, they will only bring claims that they see as 
being of greater value than the next best alternative, i.e. if they consider, explicitly or 
implicitly, that: 
 
{ Probability of claimant winning multiplied by (award assuming a win less 
claimants’ costs assuming a win, if any)  
less  
(Probability of state winning multiplied by claimant’s costs assuming a loss) } 
is greater than  
zero, or the maximum value of any settlement offered.5  
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Parties are, of course, sometimes motivated by factors other than maximizing their 
economic position in a particular case. For example, they may be considering the 
wider strategic interests of their organization, or individual managers may be acting 
with regard to their own careers at the expense of their organization. These points 
largely lie outside the scope of this Perspective; however, we do consider that (a) 
economic incentives are an important motivating force for most organizations, (b) 
other motivating factors do not favor one costs regime over another, and (c) 
contingent fee and third-party funding arrangements, which are increasingly 
prevalent, are even more likely to introduce considerations of economic rationality 
into decision-making. 
 
Under CFtE, confident claimants with strong claims are more likely to come forward 
than they would under the more traditional approach, especially if they have a smaller 
claim, because CFtE increases their payoff if they prevail; claimants with strong 
claims will necessarily accord less weight to the cost implications of losing. CFtE 
therefore increases the incentive for confident claimants to come forward with their 
cases. By contrast, less confident claimants with weak or speculative claims in 
smaller cases are likely under CFtE to give more weight to the proportionately more 




Situation  Traditional 
approach CFtE 
1. Claimants are 
confident in their 
claims 
a.  Relative incentive 
effect on claimants  Stronger deterrent  Weaker deterrent  
b.  Is the effect 
desirable? No Yes 
2. Claimants are not 
confident in their 
claims  
a.  Relative incentive 
effect on claimants Weaker deterrent  Stronger deterrent  
b.  Is the effect 
desirable? No Yes 
Note: the deterrent effect is more pronounced when claims are small relative to anticipated costs.  
We thus consider that Vasani and Ugale’s conclusion that CFtE is largely a deterrent 
to claimants in investment treaty arbitration, while the traditional approach 
encourages arbitration, is incorrect when claimants are confident in their claims 
(situation 1). A costs-allocation regime is less important when claims are large 
relative to the anticipated costs of bringing them (situation 2, when claim is large 
relative to costs). However, we do agree with Vasani and Ugale’s conclusion that 
CFtE deters potential claimants in cases in which claimants are not confident in their 
claims and the claims are small relative to the anticipated costs (situation 2, when 
claim is small relative to costs). Similar arguments can be made about counter-claims 
by states. 
We consider each of these incentive effects of CFtE to be more desirable than the 
effects of the traditional approach. Moreover, CFtE also increases the incentive for 
respondent states to settle strong claims and to dispute weak ones, which we also 
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consider desirable, both from the point of view of the specific parties as well as in 
relation to broader incentive effects. 
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 We assume that CFtE will be implemented by tribunals with careful consideration on an issue-by-
issue basis, rather than, e.g., necessarily awarding all costs to the prevailing party. 
5 Where “costs” = tribunal/ institution costs; lawyers’, experts’ and other advisers’ fees; internal 
disruption and diversion of management attention; and impact of the dispute on other aspects of the 
claimant’s business (e.g., other activities with respondent, reputational impact (positive or negative)). 
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